Dmitry Babich

Russia Today: Boris Yeltsin was the first Russian President to be buried according to Orthodox tradition. What did that mean for the country and the church here?

Dmitry Babich: Well, under Yeltsin, Russia certainly became a lot more diverse than it had been before. And the rise of the popularity of the Russian Orthodox Church was also one of the features of this new society that formed itself under Yeltsin. So I think that it is a very symbolic gesture on the part of the current authorities that the first President of Russia was buried in Orthodox tradition and with great pomp, I would say.

RT: Yeltsin was widely regarded as a deeply controversial character, but how important would you say that he was for Russia? What kind of legacy did he leave?

D.B.: Well, I think that Yeltsin was very important for several reasons. Firstly, he was the first person who became the head of state in Russia not as a successor to the previous leader of the country, but on his own. He made himself popular and he got himself elected which was a huge achievement. Secondly, under him Russia really changed, I mean some people like these changes, some people do not but certainly this is another country much closer to the world standards now than it had been in the 1980s. Thirdly, I think, that his legacy stays on with us because the political system was not reformed much since Yeltsin left power.

RT: The great media attention that was attracted to his funerals, as you mentioned he was buried in a great pomp. Which, if any, of Yeltsin's political ideas, would you say, are still in effect in Russia today?

D.B.: Yeltsin was a populist first of all. He ruled the country as a macho, as a real macho man. He was sometimes careless but he was always resolute. And Russia continues to be run according to the same principles. I mean our authorities sometimes behave very emotionally responding to challenges from abroad. There is a lot of, you know, populism in the social politics sometimes. So, I mean the system that he created in the early 1990s continues to live in many ways. Despite introduction of some forms of tighter control over arms exports and, you know, there is more order in the country, the country got stabilised. But the political system of the 1990s continues in Russia, whatever our critics in the West say.

Earlier, Dmitry Babich joined Russia Today to give his view on the state of affairs between Russia and Estonia and to comment on the Estonian government’s move to remove the Soviet war memorial from Tallinn.

Russia Today: The Estonian Foreign Minister says Russians living in Estonia have no reason to feel like second-class citizens. Amnesty International says the opposite. What do you make of that?

Dmitry Babich: It is enough to come to Tallinn and see the difference yourself. If you go to McDonald’s you will see Russians working there. In every place where people with non-prestigious jobs work you will see Russians. But if you go to the Estonian government or to the parliament, you will hear only Estonian speech. It’s prohibited to speak Russian in such places.

RT: Russian speaking non-citizens comprise almost a third of Estonia’s population. Why is it so big?

D.B.: Estonia became part of Russia back in the beginning of XVIII century. Many Russians lived there even before the WW1. When Estonia became independent in 1818, the flow of Russians stopped and some part of Russians even returned to Russia or migrated to other countries. But after WW2 Estonia became a part of the Soviet Union. At that time many Russians preferred to move there as lots of industrial plants were built there and also it was a prestigious place to live in.

RT: How tough are the current regulations on Russians living there, to work for instance?

D.B.: For example, if you are non-citizen, you cannot work in a drug store, which is quite strange for a civilized country. I never got a sufficient explanation to that from Estonians.

RT: How much politics is there behind the dispute over the removal of the World War Two monument?

D.B.: This isn’t, of course, a phenomenon of two days. The problem is that Estonia wants to take a peculiar revenge for World War Two.

RT: Isn’t a Russian, saying that, seem a bit paranoid?

D.B.: I would love the situation to be different and I would love Russians to be paranoid in this situation, but if you look at the Estonian newspapers you would start believing it. The day when Soviet soldiers liberated Estonia fromthe Nazis is called  a day of mourning there. So under the Germans it was so much better than under Russians? Of course, it is not very pleasant for Russians to hear that. The thing is that the Nazis also considered Estonians a nation inferior to them. In Poland, in Lithuania and in Estonia of that time you could see inscriptions on the buses “Only for Germans”. In the Soviet Union life was definitely not a bed of roses, but there was not such discrimination. Besides, Russians living in Estonia now are four generations far from the World War. These young people have no relation to Stalin.

RT: What about the relations between Russia and Estonia. What is Estonia in Russia’s policy and what does Russia mean for Estonia?

D.B.: Russia is not an important market for Estonian goods. It is a very important supplier of natural resources. There is one thing I would like to note. When Russia’s first President Boris Yeltsin died, Latvian and Estonian leaders were among the first to send their condolences, despite the fact that under Yeltsin the relations also weren’t that good. Returning to your question, Estonia is now a member of the EU and it will have to ratify the agreement between Russia and the EU. If they don’t ratify the agreement, it won’t go into force. Currently, it is mostly a problem of the EU as it is interested in good relations with Russia, its major oil and gas supplier. Then the EU should put a certain pressure on Estonia to make it more conciliatory towards Russia.

Earlier Dmitry Babich spoke to Russia Today about the ban on Polish meat imports to Russia, and its effect on Russia-EU relations.

Russia Today: How likely is it that this stalemate between Russia and Poland can be overcome before the EU-Russia co-operation meeting on May 18?

Dmitry Babich: Most probably, it is not likely because all the latest news indicates that both sides retain their positions. I do not expect any breakthrough in the next few days. Talking about this situation in general, it is not only a stalemate between Russia and Poland, it is a stalemate between Russia and the EU because only Poland can unblock the negotiations between Russia and the EU on the matter.

RT: But what could happen then?

D.B.: Well, right now I do not see a quick solution because normally the partnership co-operation agreement is supposed to be extended. Now it has been extended until December 2007. What is to happen later, has not been decided yet. I think the only way out is to extend the existing agreement even longer, because even if a new agreement is signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the EU representatives, it will have to be ratified by the Parliaments of all the 27 EU member-states. I do not expect that Polish Parliament or Latvian Parliament ratify it easily.

RT: The Poles say this ban is politically motivated. With the U.S. defence shield actually likely to go ahead and come into the force, what do think?

D.B.: Well, I do not think it is politically motivated because the Polish meat sales in Russia issue had first appeared on the political horizon before there was any serious talk about the U.S. anti-ballistic missiles deployment in Poland. This issue took center stage in 2005 when the negotiations between Poland and the U.S. on this matter had not yet started. So, if this issue is politically motivated it does not have direct linkage to the U.S. anti-ballistic missiles deployment in Poland.

RT: Specialists say that Russian-Polish relations have moved from cold to icy. In your opinion, is there any improvement?

D.B.: Well, right now there is no improvement and I think it can only come if one of the sides makes a concession. The problem is that Poland considers itself an aggrieved party. Poles think that they have been indirectly occupied by the Soviet Union for 50 years. So now they are trying to take some sort of revenge using the EU. On the other hand, Russia has been making concessions to the EU during the 1990s and does not want to do it any more. So, both sides are in the position where breakthroughs are unlikely.

Earlier, Dmitry Babich commented for Russia Today on the decision of Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko to dissolve the Parliament and the consequences of that move.

Russia Today: At the bottom line, did President Yushchenko have any choice in calling for the Ukrainian Parliament to be dissolved and now that he has – is there really any legal room left for talks with Prime Minister Yanukovich?

Dmitry Babich: I think that the reason why President Yushchenko decided to dissolve the Parliament was because the governing coalition was going to get about 300 MPs behind it, which is a constitutional majority. This would reduce Mr. Yushchenko’s power to almost zero, so he acted primarily protecting his own power which is not a good example of PR strategy. So right now he is in a very vulnerable position. Despite the fact that in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, most of the people support the Orange coalition and not the Blue coalition, despite that, anyone who will use violence first will lose. The person whose nerves will break down, will be the loser in this situation.

RT: Any pilitical manouverings are going to have winners and losers. Whom do you see as being the big winner and what can we expect to see unfold in the coming weeks??

D.B.: I think that both the Prime Minister and the President of Ukraine are losers at the moment because this is not a normal situation, and people perceive it very negatively. But in the long run,  the one who will use violence first will be the big loser. If violence is used, the whole Ukrainian democracy will be the big loser. We had something similar in Russia in 1993.

Earlier, Dmitry Babich commented for Russia Today on the meeting of the foreign ministers of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniester in Moscow.

Russia Today:  What will the foreign ministers be hoping to achieve in Moscow's meeting?

Dmitry Babich: All of these three states are not recognized, and they are not recognized by Russia. But Moscow is the only place where their voices are heard. So I think these three ministers came to Moscow to make their voices heard. Now crucial talks on Kosovo are being held in Vienna, and the republics view the Kosovo example as a very important precedent for them.

RT: Can you clarify Russia's position toward these three republics?

D.B.: Officially, Russia recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova. But I heard one top Russian foreign policy official saying “We recognize Georgia's territorial integrity, but we don’t want Georgian authorities holding their own citizens hostage in Abkhazia and South Ossetia." Unfortunately, the rhetoric in Tbilisi against Abkhazia and  South Ossetia is still too aggressive. And there are attempts being made to force these republics back to Georgia economically. The same applies to  Transdniester and Moldova.

RT:  What are the chances for these republics to survive as independent countries?

D.B.: They will survive, because they don’t have any other way out.  The only way for Georgia and Moldavia to reestablish territorial integrity is by dropping nationalist rhetoric and suggesting a viable alternative to Transdniester and the breakaway republics of Georgia. A viable alternative that would take these regions elites` interests into account.  Unfortunately, all we hear now is "You are separatists, we want you back and we will not listen to what you say!' And the picture drawn by the Western media is very negative: drugs, arms trade, smuggling. Those things may be there, but the picture is very one-sided.

RT: What's the likelihood of the international community doing a U-turn and recognizing the independence of any of the republics?

D.B.: It is clear that if you have tree entities officially not recognized, where thousands on people live, something is bound to happen there, especially because of the economic blockade now. To my mind, the solution is to improve relations between Georgia and Russia, Moldova and Russia, and to search for a solution that will suit everyone.  But unfortunately, right now the rhetoric is very bad on both sides. Both sides say the other side is to blame and there is not much progress. And I don’t see any significant progress in the future.

RT: One expert was saying that it is important to monitor the fate of Kosovo before we can decide on the fate of the breakaway republics. Do you agree with that?

D.B.: Russia insists on this linkage with Kosovo. The West denies this linkage in any way. To my mind there are clear similarities. But the problem is that everything will depend on the governments in Georgia and Moldova. By now South Ossetia has been independent for 15 years and a new generation has grown up that doesn’t speak Georgian. And these people will have a very difficult  life in a reunited Georgia. It will be very difficult for them to find jobs, to travel abroad, and they will be treated as second-class citizens. Unless Georgia finds a way to accommodate these people, they will not voluntarily join Georgia. 

Earlier Dmitry Babich commented on the talks between Russian and Belarusian Prime Ministers.

Mr Babich gave his view on the development of the situation: “We at least can expect that normal flow of Russian crude oil to the European Union will continue via Belarus, and we can also expect that there will be no trade war between Russia and Belarus. On December 29 Russia has already imposed new custom fees on Belarusian sugar and Belarus is very afraid that similar fees will be introduced to other Belarusian food supplies. Belarus sells about 100 percent of its food exports to Russia.”

Talking about tensions in trade relations between the two countries, he added: “We hope that these tensions will be easy, at least that is what people on both sides of the border want.”

Mr Babich explained the reasons of President Lukashenko’s popularity in Belarus: “The reason why President Lukashenko is still popular in Belarus and why he got 4o percent of the vote, even by his enemies’ estimates, was that Belarus kept a lot of jobs that were slashed in Russia because of the market reforms.  Belarus could keep these jobs both in agriculture and industry largely thanks to cheap Russian energy imports. If Russia introduces market relations and if custom tariffs are imposed on Belarusian goods that could endanger the jobs and that could put in jeopardy the so-called Belarusian economic miracle, which basically consisted in retaining all the good things about the Soviet Union.”

“Russia doesn’t try to speed up or to pay for market reforms in Belarus. Russia didn’t raise the gas price to the European level, it is only $US 100, which is about half of the European price. So Russia is trying to make this transition to market economy as smooth as possible for Belarus. Besides that, there is a very symbolic meaning to it. We have a free trade, the free trade zone with Belarus, and we are talking about the customs union. If this customs union doesn’t work out with Belarus, how could we expect it to work out with Ukraine or Kazakhstan,” the expert says.

“Relations between people and between the governments were normal. There was a conflict between presidents and between Gazprom and Belarusian people who were responsible for energy supplies in Belarus; Generally, I would say that Russian public opinion, although it supports the market relations with other former Soviet countries, wanted to avoid the scandal with Belarus. The sooner the relations normalize, the better for the governments in Belarus and Russia, because they will be able to retain their popularity this way,” Mr Babich believes.

Earlier Dmitry Babich spoke on Russia Today about the possible outcome of the Russia-Belarus gas dispute.

Mr Babich examines several aspects of the  current stand-off: “Belarus still has two weeks because they have stored some gas in advance. But one of the options that Mr Lukashenko can choose is to get the EU behind him since gas deliveries to Europe can be disrupted. On the other hand, it will be pretty difficult from the moral point of view because, for years, Europe has been reproaching Russia for subsidizing the Belorussian regime by cheap energy prices. Now, when Russia is doing exactly what the EU has asked it to do, how can they criticise Russia for that?”

The expert does not exclude the possibility that Belarus may cut gas supplies to Europe: “Ukraine did it and I see no reason why Belarus can’t do the same thing. We should not forget that Mr Lukashenko is a very unpredictable person. He will have no problems about doing that.”

“I think that what is going on now is the moment of truth for the "Unified State." For ten years, Mr Lukashenko has been only talking about it. And it is clear that President Putin is pretty angry about that. At one of his press conferences Putin said that Western Germany pumps billions of dollars into Eastern Germany. But they are financing the reunification of the nation. But what is Russia financing in the former Soviet republics that are drifting farther and farther away from Russia, and still getting our energy supplies? All in all, if Lukashenko is serious about the Union, he should allow Russian business into Belarus. Here we are talking about Russian company Gazprom buying a chunk of property in Belarus. In Europe a country is not afraid of another country’s company buying something on its territory. Why should Belarus be afraid of it if it is eager to have a Unified State with Russia?” Mr. Babich asks.

Mr Babich is sure that both the Russian and Belorussian presidents will take the credit later: “I believe we will hear about the Russian and Belorussian presidents after the deal is signed. But now Putin is trying to show that this is a purely economic conflict between the Russian company and the Belarussian Energy Ministry.”

The expert gave his own forecast: “I think there is a 60%-70% possibility that Lukashenko will back off at 10 a.m. on Monday. But there is still a 30% possibility that it won’t happen. Then it will happen a bit later next week.”

I guess there will be a kind of a compromise between Gazprom and Belarus. The price can be lowered, but certainly Gasprom will demand a share in Beltransgaz,” concluded Mr Babich.

Earlier Dmitry Babich shared his opinion on CIS summit in Minsk outcome on Russia Today.

The expert speculated on the chances of the success of the CIS reforms

“Presidents of CIS are meeting for the anniversary: 15 years ago the Commonwealth of Independent States was created. And at the beginning the idea was that this will be a union of the equals and that we will try to reintegrate our countries. Later on it turned out that some of these countries, at least some of them do not want to be integrated or want to be integrated at a slower pace than the others. So if for the reform to be successful it has to take into account the differences between CIS countries of the pace of integration,” Mr Babich said.

He doubts any firm plan of the reforms will be drafted in Minsk.

“Well, chances are pretty slim, at least chances for the consensus are pretty slim, because, Georgia, for example, is no longer interested in CIS and that it keeps the largely formal presence; Ukraine has been sort of sabotaging a lot of ideas of the CIS integration for the last 15 years and especially for the last 2 years. So I think maybe the idea could be that no one will be forced to accept the decisions taken at CIS summits. There will be no consensus like the one that exists in European Union or in OSCE,” the expert believes.

Mr Babich has drawn attention to some new dynamics in Russian-Georgian relations.

“Well, it’s very possible, but I noticed that there is a little improvement in the relations in the last several days. You know that president Putin was quoted as saying that Saakashvili somehow changed his rhetoric in the last few days. It’s clear that after the recent crisis Saakashvili became somewhat more tolerant towards Russia’s interests. And I think, if they meet that will not mean that all the differences have been ironed out and there is no more conflict between Russia and Georgia but they can meet and that would easy tension,” he stressed.

Mr Babich expressed his opinion on the problems of breakaway regions in context of the CIS summit.

“Well, I doubt it because both Voronin, the Moldovan President, and Saakashvili, they want to discuss these problems in a larger context. If there was a meeting, a summit meeting of the OSCE or maybe even NATO they would probably raise the problem, but I don’t think they will raise this issue with Russia, because the problem is that referendums were held in both Trandniester and South Ossetia. The results are not to the liking of Moldovan and Georgian Presidents. So they will not like to raise this issue with Russia at all,” the expert expects.

Mr Babich thinks any negative developments in Nagorny Karabakh could have large impact both on Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“It will probably discussed because the Nagorny Karabakh is the only problem that can destabilize the government in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. So far these countries have been relatively stable in the last few years. And Azerbaijan, you know, the transfer of power from late president Aliev to his son has been pretty successful. The only thing that could disrupt this smooth succession of power is anything that can happen in Nagorny Karabakh. If something happens in Nagorny Karabakh, Ilham Aliev’s government can become unstable and it’s something that both in Baku and to my mind even Armenia want to prevent,” he said.

Mr Babich also shared his opinion on recent Russia’s statements on possible gas price hikes for Belarus.

“Well, the latest news is that Russia actually pump more gas, via the pipelines in the Ukraine. So the Prime Minister of Yanukovich has been pretty successful in negotiating an acceptable price for Russian gas for Ukraine which is US$125 per 1000 cubic meters at least, according to the latest information. The problems exist for Belarus for whom gas making is more expansive so we’ll see how differences are decided but I’m pretty sure they will find a solution,” he believes.