It’s scary without the Ukrainians
Published 11 October, 2008, 09:07
Ukrainian military officer and journalist Dmitri Timchuk spent more then a year in Iraq with the Ukrainian troops stationed there. RT is the first to publish his observations of daily life in the country in English. (Part XI)
Not the right desert (Part II)
Americans happy to sleep with bugs (Part III)
Building the future: brick-by-brick (Part IV)
Don’t worry, they won’t shoot! (Part V)
The vampire gets stung (Part VI)
Every soldier’s fundamental – messing (Part VII)
T-shirts for Americans only (Part VIII)
Leaflets for the illiterate (Part IX)
A few sketches from Wasit
After I spent half a day in a UAZ (accompanied by two armoured patrol cars) with a dispatch of the Ukrainian military police in Kut, I noticed an interesting detail. In the central part of the city with almost half a million residents (the estimate is at least 400-450 thousand people but no one knows the exact figure), one can see people in IP (Iraqi Police) uniform almost everywhere.
At least one out of ten cars you meet will be a police pickup truck – a Chevrolet or a Toyota with a mounted machine gun. Police are everywhere.
But once you enter Al Amir, a district with 150 thousand residents, you can’t see any sign of the law enforcement agencies. This is the so-called Sector G (that’s its designation on the maps of the Multi-National Force), where the poor live in Kut.
Arms, munitions, and drugs – none of these things are rare here; neither are skirmishes, mainly during gang shootouts. The city police are simply afraid of visiting this area.
Later, commanders of our 7th mechanised brigade told me that in fact, there are criminal police here, but they wear plain clothes. It is better not to come here in uniform.
“Iraqi law enforcement officers are simply scared to carry out operations without our support,” company commander of the Ukrainian MP Igor Sukhina told me.
“Sometimes, it gets funny. Once, we raided a certain district of Kut looking for militants together with the Iraqi Police. I gave my men their respective assignments. Then their commander tells me: I won’t post any of my men without you! I tell him, ‘Look, you have six pickup trucks with mounted machine guns and a crowd of armed policemen; why do you need my patrol car? It won’t do you any good, whereas in my sector an entire block will be left unattended.’ But he insisted: no Ukrainians, no operation. That’s how we work here.”
Al Suwaira is the most dangerous spot in the Ukrainian zone of responsibility. It is right on the border of the Baghdad province, where a lot of fighting takes place. Personnel is not allowed to leave the Ukrainian FOB Zulu unless in an APC.
Our servicemen don’t drive here without armour. (In other places, they usually drive a UAZ SUV or a Gazelle minivan accompanied by an armoured patrol car or an APC.)
The contingent here has made some serious progress. Half a year ago, militants opened fire on the camp daily, as if they had a schedule.
Today, the situation in Al Suwaira is more calm. But still, during my two days in Zulu I heard gunfire. My arrival coincided with an attempted assassination of a local Sheikh, who was leaving Zulu. This was punishment for making friends with the Ukrainians.
On the day I left, a bomb went off in the centre of the city. Local authorities prefer not to think about what will happen after the Ukrainians leave.
“You are very good people. I have been working together with the Ukrainian contingent for a long time now, and I have found out that your military are very professional. We in Al Suwaira appreciate what they do. Without you, we simply will not be able to work,” Major Majeet of the Iraqi Army told me frankly.
We are driving across a bridge and immediately see a checkpoint and several Iraqi policemen. The Multi-National Force is gradually transferring responsibility into the hands of Iraqis. Our troops no longer guard strategic areas themselves. Their mission is to monitor the Iraqi Police and patrol the city.
“One time, we came to this checkpoint at night, and we see these guys all sitting inside, guarding themselves,” Major Oleg Gulyak, commander of the 72nd mechanised battalion, told me. “We told them, ‘Patrol the area; post a sentinel under the bridge. What’s the purpose of you being here if militants can come here and blow up the bridge right under your nose?!’ With these fellows, everything has to be checked.”
Also, our intelligence reports that the situation on the Iranian border has become worse. Before the Ukrainian troops came to Wasit and began to guard a 120-kilometre segment of the Iraqi-Iranian border, which was in our zone of responsibility, the situation was a complete mess.
Local residents used to cross the border freely as they pleased. The main thing was to know the way through minefields laid along the border during the Saddam era. It took a lot of labour to rebuild destroyed border forts, organise patrols and persuade the local population that they can’t walk across the border simply because they want to.
Then, after the Ukrainians managed to put things more or less in order, they transferred responsibility to local border guards from the Iraqi Border Police.
Almost immediately, the border ceased to exist once again. Smuggled goods and illegal immigrants began to arrive from Iran in great numbers. Iraqi border guards are still very timid: while they do patrol the border more or less during the day, at night they hide inside their forts.
Our troops had to demolish a water tower next to Zulu; otherwise, militants could have used it as a reference point for their mortars.
Law enforcers mass produced
The MNF’s position on maintaining stability in Iraq in the future is well-known. After MNF commanders realised that guerrilla warfare here may continue for a very long time, while present contingents for various reasons will soon be either seriously reduced or completely withdrawn, it became clear that the emphasis should be made on local law enforcement agencies. The Iraqi Police (IP), the Iraqi Army (IA—reformed from the ING, the Iraqi National Guard) and the Iraqi Border Police (IBP) were speedily organised.
Training camps were opened at coalition bases, and a “production line” for training law enforcement officials was created. Our FOB Delta in Kut hosts an academy, which prepares policemen, military and border guards. In Al Suwaira, the Ukrainians were also engaged in training local law enforcement personnel.
While a year ago there was only one battalion of the National Guard in Wasit, today there is a brigade. By the end of October, another brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 40th IA battalions, will be practically ready. Training company by company, our instructors have produced a battalion of the IP riot police, which took the same course as special police units in Ukraine. A division (!) of border guards with headquarters in Kut was formed.
The Ukrainians did an excellent job as organisers. They designed the structure for local law enforcement agencies and a system of personnel training. At one point, officers from MNF Headquarters came to take a look at the Ukrainian “secret technology” – training by units.
Previously, an American method was used: various specialists and sergeants were trained separately, and then they were put together in units.
The Ukrainians did it differently: they trained green troops by platoons and companies. In other words, already during the learning period, combat teams were formed and trained together. Later, other contingents switched to this method introduced by the Ukrainians.
It was crucial to train engineers for the Army and for the Border Police. And our instructors did train enough specialists. Now, our engineers don’t have to clear mines themselves. They just watch Iraqis do it.
In Wasit, as throughout Iraq, there are a lot of bombs, mines and shells remaining in the ground, in hidden depots and caches. Minefields along the border haven’t been cleared yet. No maps of the old minefields have been preserved; now engineers have to do a double job: clear old minefields and lay new ones.
In general, the training process is in full swing. According to the training plan, by the end of October Wasit will have all the units it needs to maintain order in the province.
After that, the responsibility will be completely transferred into the hands of the Iraqis, and our contingent will be withdrawn from Iraq. This is all very good but there is one “but.”
Permanent intern
The facts in the beginning of this article are mentioned for a reason. Ukrainians really did a lot to create a normal, functional police structure in Wasit province. First of all – the efforts of the officers from the special technical division – brigade number 7, they are now replaced by the tactic group number 81. Most of the Iraqi policemen have been trained in the last 6 months, in the near future they will run this place on their own.
But will they really be in control of the situation? That is a big question. On the one hand, it is understandable why the Ukrainians have to supervise the Iraqi guys in uniforms. No matter how intense the training is, it is impossible to fully prepare a commando team in 20 days.
It takes time, and there needs to be control and help in carrying out the tasks, while the new special force soldiers get the hang of it (bear in mind also, that even though many former Iraqi servicemen fill the officer spots in the police, among the soldiers there are many ex-farmers).
On the other hand, Iraqis see the Ukrainians as “big brothers” (in service, not in politics), who are always ready to help. Frankly speaking, Iraqis are more like interns, always about to give up on the work, “delegating” it to the mentor. And this stereotype is very strong.
To leave the local police to handle the situation on their own right now would be like giving up on the province. Would the Iraqis be able to grow out of the intern status in half a year? The official answer is yes, sure. But many of our officers, including some of the higher commanders of the Ukrainian forces, when opening up to the journalist, say a definite no.
Farewell to balance of forces?
It turns out that transferring responsibilities to the Iraqis is not an easy thing to do. Many factors, invisible to Europeans at first, play into it.
These things are very important here. First of all, we are talking about the major mistakes made by Americans from the start, as they began their “rebuilding of post-war Iraq” campaign.
In particular – trying to create state power using the foreign democracy example. Take the police for example. In this country a person with a gun is not just someone who serves the law, but a certain political element. And it is understandable that when the police was formed, the bosses began to play an important political role in the regions – naturally, they have so many armed subordinates.
We also need to take into consideration the fact that the police actively take part in making decisions that are outside of the jurisdiction of law and security. They make decisions on all levels, practically in every area of the region’s life. But there is also the civil force – the mayors and governors.
The Iraqi police report to the governor of the province. The army is controlled by Baghdad, but the capital and the bosses are far away, so local army commanders are quite independent.
A good example of the competition between army and police is As-Suveira. Initially police significantly outnumbered army here (back then they were called guardsmen), so the head of the police department had the last say on many important issues. Then much effort was put into developing the army structures, and the military became more influential than the police.
At the same time no one will attempt to make important decisions about the region without consulting with the unofficial authorities – the sheiks. Arguments between clans really complicate matters and make even the simplest matters impossible to resolve. And again it is the local residents who serve in the army and work for police, therefore these clans have representatives there as well.
To cut a long story short, I really wanted to find out how our guys managed to function in such a complicated environment. Finally one of the commanders described it this way – we realised right a way that it is useless to interfere with the local traditions and try to figure out inner relations. (Under Saddam’s rule the only effective local system of power was implemented – harsh dictatorship).
It is only because the Ukrainians have a strong authority here (the main thing being their power, not necessarily good relations with the locals), that they manage to get representatives of official and unofficial power to sit down and make decisions. It is hard to say what will happen when the Ukrainians leave.
So we come to grave conclusions, seeing how unprepared the Iraqi police and army are, considering all the contradictions, inevitable with the current state power, imposed by Americans (there is also a third factor, a very important one – terrorist organisations).
When the Ukrainian forces leave, we can expect a civil war to break out (it is very possible), or at least mounting violence and an unstable situation. Of course, we can just give up on all feeble hopes for Ukraine’s “civil”, meaning economic, presence here altogether. Then Kiev just won’t care about somewhere like Wasit province. But in that case what was the point of three Ukrainian brigades and one tactic group serving so far away from home?
Story and photos courtesy of Dmitri Timchuk
Elections as a litmus test (Part XII)
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